Expedia Group confirmed on 12 November 2026 that attackers reached its systems through a compromised third-party data platform provider. Separately, researchers at Wiz reported that between 14 and 26 October an attacker used the trusted cloud access that customers had granted the data platform Qubole, and in many cases left in place while unused, to take secrets and files.
What happened
Expedia. In a statement reported by Skift on 12 November, Expedia said it was aware of a supply chain attack in which attackers compromised a third-party data platform provider. It said its platforms remain safe for travellers and partners, that it had contained the attack and brought in outside experts, and that its investigation continues. Expedia did not name the provider or say what data was taken.
An extortion group calling itself n0n claims to hold more than 830 million loyalty programme records, 58 million traveller profiles and over 333 million account records, as Security Affairs reported on 14 November, citing Forbes. These figures are the attackers' claims. Expedia has not confirmed them.
Qubole. Wiz, working with Sentra and Mandiant, published its findings on 9 November and updated them on 11 November.
| Date (2026) | Event, as reported by the researchers |
|---|---|
| 8 to 11 October | An actor uses customer-owned AWS access keys that appear to have been created for Qubole integrations; Wiz has not linked this to the later activity |
| 14 to 26 October | An attacker uses credentials from an AWS account associated with Qubole to assume roles that customers had set up to trust that account |
| 9 November | Wiz publishes its analysis; The Hacker News reports that neither Qubole nor its owner Idera had posted a statement |
| 11 November | AWS tells BleepingComputer its services were not compromised and operated as designed; Wiz notes a report that n0n claimed the campaign |
Each request succeeded because the trust settings were still in place. In many affected environments, the attacker's requests were the only role assumptions from the vendor account in October, so these were connections nobody was using. Through them, the attacker read stored secrets, Lambda environment variables and storage buckets, then tested the keys it found, including Okta and Microsoft Entra ID credentials. How the attacker obtained the Qubole credentials has not been disclosed.
The link is not confirmed. Skift describes Qubole as a onetime Expedia vendor and some reports connect the two incidents, but Expedia has not said its provider was Qubole, and Skift reports that outside researchers have not publicly named Expedia as an affected Qubole customer.
What it means for businesses
These points are our reading of the reports, not statements by the companies.
Access outlives contracts. Ending a vendor contract does not remove the access you granted. A role created for a trial or a past project keeps working until someone deletes it.
Unused access is the easiest to abuse. Because the connections were idle, nothing looked normal or abnormal to the owners. No one was watching traffic they did not expect to exist.
One vendor account can open many companies. When many customers trust the same vendor identity, one stolen credential reaches all of them at once.
Rotating passwords is not enough on its own. Wiz points out that changing a secret does not end temporary sessions already issued, so active sessions must be revoked as well.
What to do next
- List every outside party with access to your cloud accounts, data warehouse, CRM and ERP: vendors, integration platforms, former agencies and past contractors. Remove anything no longer in use.
- If you ever connected Qubole, follow the Wiz guidance: review AWS CloudTrail from 1 October for role assumptions from the vendor account, revoke active sessions, rotate every secret the role could read, and delete or tighten the trust policy.
- Narrow what remains. Limit vendor roles to the specific data they need, and add network conditions such as an allowed source address range where the platform supports them.
- Log data reads, not only configuration changes. Standard cloud audit logs may not record file downloads unless storage data events are switched on.
- Add offboarding to vendor contracts: who removes access, by when, and how removal is confirmed.
The same rules apply to every integration you build or buy; see the security section of our system integration approaches guide and our DevOps and cloud infrastructure service.
Timeline Digital, a custom software development company founded in 2013 in Islamabad, builds system and API integrations as managed projects, with each connection's credentials, scope and removal on exit documented in the handover. Every project starts with a free pilot: Before you commit to the full project, we build 2 to 3 of your key modules as working software, free of charge, ready in about 2 days. Your team tests the pilot, and the full build starts only after you approve it.
Sources
- Expedia Confirms Cyberattack Through Third-Party Vendor, Skift, 12 November 2026
- Extortion Group Claims Theft of Nearly One Billion Expedia Traveler Records, Security Affairs, 14 November 2026
- Trusted by Default: Qubole Cross-Account Access Abused in the Wild, Wiz, 9 November 2026, updated 11 November 2026
- Hackers Exploit Qubole's Trusted AWS Access to Breach Customer Accounts and Steal Data, The Hacker News, 9 November 2026
- Hackers exploit trusted AWS access to breach multiple cloud environments, BleepingComputer, 10 November 2026, updated 11 November 2026