On 16 November 2026, attackers injected malicious JavaScript into Optimizely Web Experimentation snippets used by at least 178 organisations, including the BBC, CNN, Zoom and HSBC. Because the code came from Optimizely's own CDN, browsers trusted it. Payloads swapped crypto addresses, skimmed card fields and routed visitors on older iPhone software to exploit kits.
What happened
Report URI, a company that monitors the scripts running on websites, found the injected code on 16 November. Of the 1,611 Optimizely snippets it checked, 188 belonging to 178 organisations carried the code, and it says the true number is probably higher. Named sites include the BBC, CNN, Zoom, GitLab, Salesforce, Equifax, HSBC and IKEA, according to SecurityWeek, and Report URI found the code on Optimizely's own website and login page.
| Time on 16 November (UTC) | Event, as reported by Report URI |
|---|---|
| 04:21 | First injected code seen, in the BBC's snippet |
| 08:10 | First version of the crypto address swapper |
| 13:43 | Card skimmer added |
| 17:13 to 17:57 | Hidden frame added that sends older iOS versions to exploit kits |
| About 20:40 to 21:10 | Most sites cleaned |
| 23:11 | All known infected Optimizely files clean |
The code was placed in each project's optional JavaScript field, which runs on every page that loads the snippet. Companies that host the snippet themselves were affected too, because its contents come from the same project.
What the code did. It replaced cryptocurrency wallet addresses in pages, forms and the clipboard. It read card number, expiry date and security code from a site's own form fields, but card fields inside a payment provider's hosted frame, such as Stripe or Adyen, were out of its reach. When it swapped an address next to wallet or payment wording, it sent the page address, readable cookies and a screenshot of the page to the attacker. Researchers describe the iPhone routing as delivery attempts, not confirmed device compromises. By the evening of 16 November, Report URI counted about $7,000 received by the attacker's wallets.
What Optimizely says. Its status page update on 18 November says an unauthorised third party exploited a flaw in the Web Experimentation account signup flow to impersonate users on targeted customer accounts. It says this was not a credentials breach, that it closed the flaw within three hours of detection, and that fewer than 5% of its customers were affected. Optimizely told TechTarget it removed the injected code, ended active sessions, revoked tokens and reset access for affected users, and is investigating with outside experts. It says it has contacted every Web Experimentation customer directly.
What it means for businesses
Our reading, not Optimizely's or the researchers':
A trusted domain does not make a trusted script. The files came from a legitimate address with a valid certificate. A security policy that simply allows a vendor's domain let the malicious content run.
Marketing tags run with full access to the page. Testing, analytics, chat and advertising scripts can read anything a visitor types, including on checkout and login pages, unless you keep them off those pages.
Security headers helped where they were strict. Report URI checked the security policies on 256 hosts run by affected organisations. In its results, 68 had no Content Security Policy at all, and only 24 had one that blocked the payload outright. HSBC's policy blocked the external file, but an inline copy of the code still ran because the policy allowed eval.
Hosted payment fields limited the damage. Sites that collected card details in their own forms were exposed. Card details typed into a payment provider's hosted fields were out of the skimmer's reach.
What to do next
- If you use Optimizely Web Experimentation, follow Optimizely's guidance. Review your project JavaScript for code you did not add, check who has write access and which API tokens exist, and treat card details entered on your own forms on 16 November as possibly exposed.
- List every third-party script on each page template, with an owner and a reason, and remove the ones nobody needs.
- Keep tags off checkout, login and account pages wherever the business can live without them.
- Take card details only through your payment provider's hosted fields or payment page.
- Set a Content Security Policy with strict script and connection rules. Start in report-only mode, and avoid allowing eval.
- Monitor for changed scripts and new data destinations. If card details are entered on payment pages you run, PCI DSS v4 requires an inventory of the scripts on those pages with a business reason for each (requirement 6.4.3) and alerts when their scripts or security headers change without authorisation (requirement 11.6.1).
For the server-side version of the same problem, see our article on the Expedia vendor breach and old vendor access.
Timeline Digital, a custom software development company founded in 2013 in Islamabad, builds websites and web applications as managed projects, and under maintenance and support can review the third-party scripts and security headers on a site you already run. Every project starts with a free pilot: Before you commit to the full project, we build 2 to 3 of your key modules as working software, free of charge, ready in about 2 days. Your team tests the pilot, and the full build starts only after you approve it.
Sources
- World's largest brands infected with malware via Optimizely, Report URI (Scott Helme), 16 November 2026, updated 17 November 2026
- Web Experimentation Security Incident, Optimizely, 17 November 2026, updated 18 November 2026
- Optimizely Vulnerability Exploited to Serve Malware on Major Websites, SecurityWeek, 17 November 2026
- Hijacked Optimizely Scripts Served Card Skimmer and iOS Exploit Kits to CNN, BBC and Zoom Visitors, The Hacker News, 17 November 2026
- Optimizely supply chain attack turns trusted scripts against 178 orgs, TechTarget, 17 November 2026, updated 18 November 2026